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when choosing them, can rightfully take definite action 
upon amendments or revisions; they must submit the 
results of their deliberations to the people—who alone 
are competent to exercise the right of sovereignty in 
framing the fundamental law—for ratification or rejec-
tion. The convention is the representative only in a 
very qualified sense, and for the specific purpose, and 
with the restricted authority to put in proper form the 
questions of amendment upon which the people are to 
pass; but the changes in the fundamental law of the 
state must be enacted by the people themselves." 
There was a time in the past when the doctrine was urged 
that the constitutional convention exercised the whole sov-
ereignty rights of the people on the theory that the conven-
tion represented the people themselves. This doctrine, how-
ever, has never gained much following and is now no longer 
advocated. 
See Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39. Also Wood's Appeal, 75 
Pa. St. 59, where the court said: 
"No argument for the implied power of absolute sov-
ereignty in a convention can be drawn from revolution-
ary times, when necessity begets a new government." 
See also 
Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, Chap. VI. 
Most of the authorities supporting the doctrine above are 
drawn from revolutionary secession and territorial conven-
tions which, as we have seen above, are not proper prece-
dents. 
The cases above and Mr. Jameson adopt the theory that 
a convention can be restricted in its powers by the legis-
lature and that any action of a convention contrary to legis-
lative restrictions is invalid. This view represents an ex-
treme opposite view to the one first mentioned, and it too is 
no longer accepted by the best writers and courts. 
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See 
Dodd, Chap. I I I . 
Hoar, Chap. IX. 
Braxton, "Powers of Conventions," 7 Va. L. Reg. 79. 
29 Harvard Law Rev. 528. 
The most modern and what rationally seems to be the most 
reasonable view "regards the convention as a regular organ 
of the existing government coordinate with the existing 
branches. In its sphere of constitution making, it should be 
supreme, subject only to the limitation by the people. I t 
should be free from legislative attempt to limit its powers of 
revision; on the other hand, it should probably be subor-
dinate to the legislature in purely legislative matters, * * * ." 
See 
29 Harvard Law Review, 528 at 530. 
Dodd, pp. 80 and 87. 
Braxton, "Powers of Conventions," 7 Va. L. Reg. 79 
at 96. 
Hoar, Chap. IX. 
The first Pennsylvania case, Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39, 
is the one upon which Judge Jameson bases his case for the 
control of the convention by the legislature. Both Judge 
Jameson and Braxton wrote in order to avert the doctrine of 
conventional supremacy. (Jameson §313; Braxton, 7 Va. 
L. R. 79.) But Judge Jameson fails to notice that the sec-
ond Pennsylvania case proceeded on the theory that the leg-
islature can not limit the convention, but that the people 
can and, in the instance before the court, did. (Wood's Ap-
peal. 75 Pa. St. 59.) The language of the case is (pp. 71-2): 
" I t is simply evasive to affirm that the legislature can 
not limit the right of the people to alter or reform their 
government. Certainly it can not. . . . When the people 
act through a law, the act is theirs, and the fact that 
they used the legislature as their instrument to confer 
their powers makes them the superiors and not the leg-
islature." 
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Even Jameson refused to admit the logical extremities of 
his theory,—for example, he took the position that legisla-
tive interference with a convention must be (p. 364), 
"subject to the limitation, that its requirements must be 
in harmony with the principles of the convention system, 
or rather, not inconsistent with the exercise by the con-
vention, to some extent, of its essential and character-
istic function." 
This admission, as both Dodd and Hoar note, "knocks the 
very bottom out of the theory of legislative supremacy." 
Hoar, p. 114; Dodd, p. 73. 
The independence of conventions from legislative restric-
tion has been frequently announced judicially. In Loomis vs. 
Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613, 708, the court laid down as funda-
mental principles: 
"First . That a constitutional convention lawfully 
convened does not derive its powers from the legislature, 
but from the people. 
"Second. That the powers of a constitutional con-
vention are in the nature of sovereign powers. 
"Third. That the legislature can neither limit nor 
restrict them in the exercise of these powers." 
In Carleton vs. Secretary of State (1908), 151 Mich. 337, 
115 N. W. 429, the Chief Justice said: 
"By necessary implication, the legislature is pro-
hibited from any control over the method of revising the 
constitution. The convention is an independent and 
sovereign body. . . . I t is elected by the people, answer-
able to the people, and its work must be submitted to the 
people through their electors for approval and disap-
proval." 
Judge Hooker, who dissented in that case, said: 
"The convention has a sphere in which the legislature 
can not intrude, a discretion that it can not control." 
Mr. Dodd sums up the matter of legislative restrictions 
thus, (pp. 91, 9 2 ) : 
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"The restrictions placed upon conventions have cer-
tainly not in practice been recognized as of binding 
force, except in a few cases, and theoretically the con-
vention in the performance of its proper functions 
should be independent of the regular legislative organs 
of the state. Legislative acts are usually necessary for 
the assembling of conventions, but this dependence of 
conventions upon legislatures has as yet caused few 
conflicts." 
• • * 
"As a rule, then, constitutional conventions are sub-
ject only to the following restrictions: (1) those con-
tained in or implied from provisions in the existing 
state and federal constitutions, and (2) in the absence 
of constitutional provisions, those derived or implied 
from the limited functions of conventions." 
Hoar makes his own conclusion thus (p. 115) : 
"From all the foregoing we see that the legislature 
probably has no power to restrict either an authorized 
or a popular convention; whenever it has succeeded 
this has been due more to force of circumstances than 
to legal rights. Even the power to impose reasonable 
restrictions is doubtful." 
The chief difficulty in connection with this question as to 
how far the convention is subject to legislative control is 
where to draw the line as to the scope of the convention's in-
dependent sphere. The particular issue on which the deci-
sion is most important concerns the adoption of the consti-
tution drawn by the convention. At the start of this section 
we read Judge Cooley's view that the proposed constitution 
must be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection. 
The overwhelming weight of historical precedents sustains 
this. (See Dodd, p. 62, et seq.) I t is the mode of adoption 
most consonant with the theory of the constitution emanat-
ing from the sovereign people. (The constitution of every 
state admitted to the union since 1836 has been approved by 
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the people. Dodd, p. 64, note 72.) Those instances in which 
historical precedent has departed from this step have been 
almost exclusively confined to the Revolutionary and Civil 
War periods. The other instances where proposed constitu-
tions have not been submitted to the people chiefly arose in 
the South after the Civil War from the conventions called 
to disenfranchise the negroes and in which the democratic 
principle of the sovereignty of the people was abandoned and 
only a pretense of legitimacy maintained. 
Judge Jameson says, pp. 490-91: 
"An important part of the duty of a convention is to 
submit to the sovereign for its approval the proposi-
tions of constitutional law which i t has matured. 
"The duty of submission grows out of the nature of 
our institutions." 
and on p. 494: 
"But suppose there has been no submission to the 
people, no means used to collect their opinion upon 
the question, aside from precedents, would the legisla-
ture then be competent to authorize definite action by a 
convention, or the latter be empowered to take i t? The 
answer must be in the negative." 
Hoar also is of the opinion that the prevailing law re-
quires submission to the people. He says, p. 195: 
"We have already seen that it is the general custom 
to submit constitutional changes to the people, even 
when not required by the express terms of the conven-
tion act. In fact, there have been expressions of opin-
ion to the effect that the action of an extra-constitu-
tional convention has no validity until ratified by the 
people." 
Hoar quotes Judge Marcus Morton of Massachusetts, who 
in connection with the Massachusetts convention of 1853 
aptly expressed the principles involved. Hoar, p. 196, Deb. 
Mass. Conv. 1853, Vol. 1, p. 75: 
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"If the people choose to adopt what we submit to 
them, it then becomes authoritative—not because it 
comes from a legally constituted body, but because the 
people choose to adopt it." 
The subsidiary question to this one of submission is what 
body controls the submission. Is the manner and time of 
submission within the field in which the convention has in-
dependent authority, or is it within the field in which the 
legislature is authoritative? The latter view is the one 
naturally adopted by Judge Jameson and the one held by the 
two Pennsylvania cases, Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39, and 
Woods Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59. However, in New Hampshire 
the Opinion of the Justices, 76 N. H. 612; in Michigan, Carl-
ton vs. Sec. of State, 151 Mich. 337; and in Missouri, State 
vs. Neal, 42 Mo. 119, are of a different opinion. Hoar sustains 
the right of the convention to prescribe the details of submis-
sion (p. 197). He says: 
"When the time for submission is prescribed by the 
convention act, can the convention change the time? 
This must needs be within the inherent powers of a 
convention, even tho the convention act be popular 
rather than legislative. Otherwise the whole procedure 
might come to nought because of a technical restric-
tion." 
Dodd also shows that control over submission is a matter 
within the convention's independent authority (pp. 87-8). 
He says: 
"Upon the larger question as to whether a constitu-
tion shall or shall not be submitted to the people, and 
as to the method of submission if i t is submitted, al-
though there is little authority either way, i t would 
seem that the legislature cannot bind a convention; 
Wells vs. Bain and Judge Jameson's work are the only 
authorities supporting to its full extent the theory of 
conventional subordination to the legislature. Judge 
Jameson took the ground that the submission of a con-
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stitution is an act within the power of the ordinary 
legislature, but it is difficult to look upon it otherwise 
than as a step in the framing of a constitution. To 
admit that af ter a convention has acted the legislature 
may submit its work in any way it thinks proper, or 
may defeat the proposed constitution by refusing to 
submit it at all (if the existing constitution requires 
such submission), is practically to destroy the value of 
the convention as an independent organ." 
In Loomis vs. Jackson, 6 W. Ya. 613, 708, and in Sproule 
vs. Fredericks, 69 Miss. 898, dicta, uphold the convention's 
freedom from legislative restrictions. In the last case the 
court expressly says the legislature has no power to require 
a convention to submit its work to the people, but in that 
instance the legislature had not made any effort so to restrict 
the convention. 
The questions asked by the Governor on this particular 
matter are: 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power 
if the General Assembly should provide by law: 
" (d ) for the organization and conduct of such con-
vention ; 
" (e) for the submission to the people for their rati-
fication and adoption, of any constitution or amend-
ments proposed by such convention : " 
In view of the above authorities, the leading ones 
in this country on the subject, it is seen that the modern 
view is that the convention is a separate organ of the sov-
ereign state which is independent within its own field; that 
its scope of authority extends to the conduct of its proceed-
ings, and the submission of its work to the people. If this 
were not so, the convention would be so hedged in by legis-
lative enactment that it would become the servant of and 
express the will of the legislature and not of the people. 
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We would submit to the Court that in answering ques-
tions (d) and (e) that the answer should be: That the leg-
islature cannot limit the powers of the convention to act 
upon either of these subject matters. 
SUMMARY RE CONVENTION PROCEDURE 
I t would be unfortunate indeed if the people lost a first 
opportunity to express their views as to the calling of a con-
vention. I t would also be a further misfortune if the people 
lost the opportunity to vote upon the election of all of the 
personnel who are to represent them in the framing of the 
new Constitution. Finally, it is of the highest importance 
that the people and the people alone should vote upon the 
ratification or rejection of the work of their convention. The 
omission of either one of the three steps in taking a vote of 
the people would be unfortunate, but it might be a complete 
failure as an expression of the will of the people if either the 
first or last were omitted. Further, such a course of action 
would result in a speeding up of the processes by which a 
new Constitution is made to such an extent that the people 
would fail to grasp the situation and act intelligently, and 
"our Conventions would become the arenas, and our Consti-
tutions the objects as well as the instruments of party con-
flict." (Jameson, Sec. 532). 
Fortunately, constitutional law as propounded by the au-
thorities above cited forbids: (1) the calling of a constitu-
tional convention by the General Assembly before first re-
ceiving authority to do so by a referendum to the people; 
(2) the interference in any manner by the legislature with 
the right of the people to elect all the delegates to a consti-
tutional convention, thereby prohibiting the legislature from 
authorizing the General Officers of the state to be members 
of such convention : and (3) the General Assembly exercising 
any control whatever over the action or work of the conven-
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tion. Such being the law, the inquiry of the governor insofar 
as it affects these subjects of discussion should be answered 
in the negative. 
V. THE FRAMERS OF OUR CONSTITUTION IN-
TENDED THAT THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD 
NOT BE ALTERED THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 
In view of the constitutional experience of the people of 
Rhode Island during the half century prior to 1842, no one 
will deny that they were ignorant of the fact that a constitu-
tion could not only be framed but also could be altered or 
amended through the medium of a constitutional conven-
tion. For example, they had before them the constitution 
of the United States, which provides as one of two methods 
of amendment, for the calling of a convention by Congress 
for proposing amendments upon the application of the legis-
latures of two-thirds of the states and for the ratification of 
such proposals by conventions in three-fourths of the states. 
Moreover, they had before them the original constitutions of 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania and 
Georgia, which provided for amendment by a constitutional 
convention only, whereas the original constitutions of Mary-
land, Delaware and South Carolina made provision for con-
stitutional amendments by legislative proposal only. 
None of the original state constitutions provided for 
amendment by both methods, and during the first sixty years 
only four constitutions so provided, namely, that of the 
United States of 1787, those of Delaware of 1792 and 1831, 
and that of South Carolina of 1790. In other words, the con-
vention of 1842 was confronted with a choice of adopting one 
or both of two well recognized methods of amending the new 
constitution. 
There is, of course, the third possibility of omitting to 
mention any method of amendment, which was the fact in 
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connection with six of the original revolutionary state con-
stitutions. For a more detailed statement of the existing sit-
uation see Dodd, "The Revision and Amendment of State 
Constitutions" (1910), pp. 118 ff. 
However, in view of the fact that the charter of 1663 con-
tained no provision for its amendment and in view of the dif-
ficulty experienced by the people of Rhode Island prior to 
1842 in bringing about changes in their government, it can 
hardly be questioned that when the delegates framed the 
constitution of 1842 they intended to make a definite choice 
with reference to the manner in which the document should 
thereafter be altered or amended and that their choice was 
given expression in the provisions of Article XI I I . 
I t is submitted that a mere statement of the existing situ-
ation is a conclusive answer to any argument that the con-
vention method of amendment was intended by its framers to 
be authorized by the constitution. However, if further argu-
ments are deemed necessary, it may be profitable to pursue 
the subject further. 
The brief statement of the constitutional history of Rhode 
Island contained herein and in Appendix A clearly indicates 
that the experience of the people of Rhode Island with con-
stitutional conventions had been sufficiently unfortunate to 
discredit its fur ther usefulness. For more than half a cen-
tury agitation for a convention had been a disturbing ele-
ment in the political life of the state. The two great issues 
before the people were (1) the extension of the suffrage to 
others than landholders and (2) the reapportionment of 
representation in the General Assembly; otherwise the 
framework of government and its administration was gen-
erally satisfactory to the people and, as a matter of fact, 
the constitution of 1842 provides for a government which 
differs little from the pre-existing government, except in 
these two important particulars. Accordingly, if a conven-
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tion could have been held which would have altered the ex-
isting government in these particulars, it is reasonable to 
hold that the agitation for further conventions would have 
ceased. However, in the absence of specific provision for 
amending the existing government, the people realized that 
the only reasonable method of accomplishing the desired re-
forms was through the means of a constitutional convention, 
whereby they could reduce to writing in one document the 
essential features of their existing government and certain 
desired reforms. 
But history shows that although the people were agreed 
as to the fundamental method of effecting the desired 
changes, there was great difficulty in getting a convention 
organized and in securing the acceptance by the people of the 
work of any particular convention. Thus in 1821 and 1822 
the freemen expressed their unwillingness to have a conven-
tion, and although a convention was held in 1824, the pro-
posed constitution was rejected at the polls. A second con-
vention was held in 1834 and adjourned without accomplish-
ing anything. Likewise the landholders convention of 1841 
accomplished nothing, and it was only the painful exper-
ience culminating immediately in the Dorr Rebellion that 
resulted in our present constitution being adopted in 1842. 
Such being the experience of the people of Rhode Island with 
constitutional conventions, it is not surprising that in fram-
ing a new constitution they declared in effect that they 
would have none of it, but instead chose the other generally 
accepted method of amending constitutions, to wit, propos-
als by the general assembly to the people. 
The conclusion above stated appears particularly sound 
in view of the fact that the Landholders' Constitution, the 
Peoples' Constitution and the Constitution of 1842 con-
tained an Article X I I I which were practically identical, ex-
cept that the Peoples' Constitution required a majority in-
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stead of a three-fifths vote to make legislative proposals for 
amendments effective. 
I t may be argued that since there is no express prohibition 
of the convention method of amendment, it is to be assumed 
that the framers of the constitution intended that that 
method was to be exercised as it had been under the charter 
government, However, it is clear from what has already 
been said in the course of argument that the political leaders 
and scholars of the day realized that as theretofore utilized 
a constitutional convention was an agency of revolution or 
of constitutional necessity, because it was not specifically 
authorized by the existing government, whether it be called a 
constitutional government or a charter government. Ac-
cordingly, if it were intended that the convention method 
was thereafter to be regarded as a constitutional method of 
amendment, the framers would have so stated in the consti-
tution as specifically as they stated that amendments could 
be made by the legislative proposal method. They would 
not have run the risk of having their intention thwarted by 
fu ture political controversy. 
Further , if the delegates had intended and decided that 
the convention method of amendment was thereafter to be 
constitutional, they would not only have said so in the Con-
stitution, but they would have made suitable provision for 
the manner of calling, qualifications of delegates, organiza-
tion, rules of procedure, and method for carrying into effect 
the changes adopted by the convention. As has already been 
indicated, these details had already assumed significant im-
portance in previous convention experiences. Moreover, the 
law was by no means clear whether a convention was com-
pelled to submit its work to the people, whether it was re-
quired to conform to rules of procedure laid down by the 
legislature, or whether it was itself the judge of the manner 
in which the new constitution or amendments were to be 
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promulgated. These were serious and difficult questions, and 
it is a sad commentary upon the intelligence and political 
foresight of the delegates to say that knowing these difficul-
ties, they intended the convention method to be constitutional 
and left open to fu ture debate such important details. The 
omission to say anything about such matters is silent testi-
mony to the fact that the convention method and all that 
concerns it was intentionally omitted and never intended to 
be constitutionally employed. On this phase of the situation 
see 
12 C. J., pp. 684-687. 
Moreover, there was no need of an express prohibition of 
a constitutional convention in our constitution, since under 
constitutional government the exercise of a revolutionary 
right is always prohibited by any constitution. I t is non-
sense to urge that unless a constitution prohibits revolution, 
a revolutionary act is thereby constitutional. But as has al-
ready been argued, the presence of Article X I I I is in effect a 
prohibition of the convention method and the argument 
should stop there. In view of the experience of Rhode Island 
with revolution, it can hardly be argued that the delegates of 
1842 were ignorant of the principle involved and had any 
other intent than to make the legislative proposal method ex-
clusive of all others. 
By adopting the method provided by Article XI I I , the 
delegates chose the method adopted by approximately half 
the constitutions then existing. However, it differed from 
many in certain details, and it is submitted that in adopting 
such details the delegates intended to exclude the convention 
method. Briefly stated, Article X I I I provides that two 
legislatures must favor a proposed amendment before 
it can be submitted to the people and that the pro-
posed amendment can become effective only by a three-
fifths affirmative vote of the electors voting. In other 
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states it is sometimes provided that the proposal go 
before only one legislature before being submitted to 
the people; in still others the proportion of the popular 
vote necessary for adoption is more or less than three-fifths. 
On the other hand, a constitutional convention is usually 
called upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the people, 
is organized and does its work within a short time thereafter, 
and the new constitution or amendments may or may not be 
submitted to the people for adoption. Thus it will be ob-
served that under the provisions of Article X I I I the dele-
gates developed a method of amendment which required (1) 
consideration by one legislature, (2) a waiting period for 
consideration by the people before the next election, (3) con-
sideration by a second legislature, (4) action by the people 
af ter ample opportunity for discussion, and (5) adoption by 
a three-fifths popular vote. I t is submitted that it is mere idle 
talk to argue that although the delegates incorporated into 
Article X I I I so deliberate a method of amendment, neverthe-
less, they intended an alternative method to be available, 
which would permit amendments to be made hastily and 
without the opportunity for cold reason to replace the im-
petuous heat of an aggressive political campaign. The mere 
reading of Article X I I I is a sufficient answer to any such 
attempted argument. 
Finally, it is submitted that the very framework and con-
tent of the Constitution as it was adopted in 1842 shows an 
intent to eliminate the constitutional convention method of 
amending its provisions. May it be said to the credit of the 
delegates that they well understood the fundamental princi-
ples of American constitutional government and fully real-
ized the purpose of a written constitution of government as 
defined at the beginning of this brief; to wit, 
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"That fundamental law of a state which contains the 
principles on which government is founded, regulates 
the division of sovereign powers, and directs to what 
persons each of these powers is to be intrusted and 
the manner of its exercise." 
Rarely will one find a constitution of government which 
measures up to the foregoing conception more than that of 
the State of Rhode Island. I t contains the usual Bill of 
Rights, qualifications of electors, the departments of govern-
ment and their powers, provisions governing elections, a 
declaration regarding education, a provision for amend-
ments, and no more. Every provision is basic and funda-
mental and obviously intended to be lasting and permanent. 
Such being the nature of the provisions contained in the 
document and such being the obvious intent of its founders, 
it requires little argument to demonstrate that any amend-
ments thereto were intended to be of the same nature and 
were intended to be equally permanent, As originally drafted 
the constitution contained provisions which were well recog-
nized by the charter government or had been the subject of 
public discussion for half a century. When it came to draft-
ing a new constitution, the framers knew what they wanted, 
the only real dispute centering about the franchise and 
method of apportionment for representatives. Accordingly, 
it cannot be said that the constitution itself was drafted in 
haste. But above all it embodied principles which our an-
cestors hoped would never change. Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that the method of amendment incorporated into 
the instrument was one which required ample time for dis-
cussion and deliberation and more than a majority of the 
popular vote before any change could be made effective. When 
one contrasts the safeguards inherent in the method adopted 
with the risks incident to a constitutional convention, there 
can be no doubt that the framers of the constitution intended 
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to exclude the lat ter as a constitutional method of amend-
ment. 
I t is submitted, therefore, tha t there can be no question 
that the f ramers of our constitution intended to exclude the 
convention method of amendment, because (1) such method 
is not specified although well known to the f ramers ; (2) the 
experience of the people of Rhode Island with such method 
had been unsat isfactory; (3) the provisions of Article X I I I 
are contained in the Landowners' Constitution, the Peoples' 
Constitution and the Constitution of 1842, and the conven-
tion method is not mentioned therein; (4) no procedure is 
provided for the employment of such method, whereas de-
tailed procedure is provided in Article X I I I for the employ-
ment of the legislative proposal method; (5) such method is 
omitted, despite the fact tha t it was specifically mentioned 
in certain constitutions authorizing both methods; (6) the 
conservative procedure required in employing the legislative 
proposal method negatives any alleged intent to authorize 
the more radical procedure of the convention method; and 
(7) the obvious, intended fundamental nature and obvious, 
intended permanency of the Constitution indicates an intent 
to effect changes only by the deliberate method provided by 
Article X I I I . 
C O N C L U S I O N 
I. THE RHODE ISLAND CONSTITUTION CAN BE 
LEGALLY REVISED OR AMENDED ONLY AS AL-
LOWED IN ARTICLE XIII. 
II. EVEN IF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAN CALL 
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, IT MUST 
FIRST RECEIVE AUTHORITY T O D O SO BY A 
REFERENDUM T O THE PEOPLE. 
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III. IF A CONSTITUTIONAL C O N V E N T I O N IS 
CALLED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS NO 
POWER TO PROVIDE THAT THE GENERAL 
OFFICERS OF THE STATE SHALL BY VIRTUE 
OF THEIR OFFICES BE MEMBERS OF SUCH 
CONVENTION. 
IV. IF A CONSTITUTIONAL C O N V E N T I O N IS 
CALLED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS NO 
POWER TO CONTROL THE ACTION OR WORK 
OF SUCH CONVENTION. 
V. THE FRAMERS OF OUR CONSTITUTION IN-
TENDED THAT THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD 
NOT BE ALTERED THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 
So far as we have been able to determine, there is no legal 
precedent supporting the proponents in their position that 
the legislature may directly call a constitutional convention 
under any constitution similar to our own. On the other 
hand, there are authorities directly against them, as we have 
shown. 
However, i t is to the Rhode Island constitutional history, 
to the Rhode Island conditions and to the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court that we should look almost exclusively for 
guidance in determining the intention of the people of Rhode 
Island when they adopted the amendment section of the 
Rhode Island Constitution. 
In 1883 it was the unanimous opinion of the justices of 
this Court that the legislature could not call a constitutional 
convention, even for the purpose of framing a new Constitu-
tion, much less for the purpose of amending the present 
Constitution. Technically, the opinion may not be binding 
upon the present justices of this Court, not being rendered 
in a litigated case. However, i t is more than the expression 
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of the unanimous opinion of five learned men; it is the opin-
ion of the justices of this Court given in their official capacity 
as such. I t has been acquiesced in by the people for over 
fifty years. No action has ever been taken contrary thereto. 
The accepted interpretation of our own Constitution by the 
justices of our own Supreme Court for these reasons and be-
cause of its soundness should not be lightly cast aside. 
A constitution is a people's document. I t should be con-
strued with common sense and not given any strained or 
legalistic interpretation. The pettifogger is out of his ele-
ment in constitutional law. 
The framers of the Constitution and the people in adopt-
ing the Constitution of 1842 understood clearly the nature 
of a constitution. They knew that they were setting up a 
framework of government and delegating to their represen-
tatives in the several branches of the government certain 
powers. They welcomed the opportunity to set down in 
writing certain rights which were not to be interfered with 
by their government. They were also fully aware of the fact 
that they were tying their own hands for the protection of 
minorities and individuals in their rights. They realized 
also that time might demonstrate the necessity of making 
changes in the written Constitution and they therefore in-
serted an amendment article providing the means of their 
choice for changing the compact. 
They needed no citation of legal precedents to inform 
them that if a constitution contains no provision for its 
amendment, it may be amended by a majority of the people 
in an orderly manner at any time. They had lived for one 
hundred and eighty years under a charter which had no pro-
vision for i ts amendment. They knew that it could be 
amended at will by the English Crown up to the time that 
they adopted the charter, af ter they had thrown off allegi-
ance to the Mother Country; and that af ter that time it 
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could be amended by themselves, but just how, was a trouble-
some question. 
On this occasion, they wanted to make it perfectly clear 
that the Constitution could be amended and to define in 
great detail in the instrument itself exactly how this could 
be accomplished. They undoubtedly considered the amend-
ment article one of the most important provisions of the 
Constitution. 
If ever a people in framing a Constitution had in mind 
the desirability of providing clearly just how the Constitu-
tion could be amended, it was the people of Rhode Island in 
1842, who had just experienced great distress caused by 
contention as to whether the Constitution under which they 
were living (the adopted charter) could be amended and if 
so, in exactly what manner. 
The people at that time had before them the constitutions 
of many states. They had that of New Hampshire which 
had been adopted in the Revolutionary period. This provided 
for its amendment only through a constitutional convention. 
They had the United States Constitution which provided 
for the alternative methods, through legislative proposals 
and through a constitutional convention. They had also a 
very large number of constitutions of other states which 
had been adopted from time to time as well as those of the 
other states which were then in force. 
They knew that in many of the constitutions the legisla-
tive proposal method was the only one incorporated in the 
amendment clauses. They saw a great variety of ways set 
out for amending constitutions by the legislative proposal 
method. In some, more than a majority of the legislature 
was required for the proposal of an amendment. In others, 
amendments could be proposed by one legislature or one leg-
islature proposed and a succeeding legislature approved 
before amendments were submitted to the people. They ob-
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served that the adoption by the people was in some cases 
by a majority vote and in others by more than a majority 
vote. 
They had knowledge of other constitutions which in addi-
tion to the legislative proposal method had adopted the con-
stitutional convention method. Where the convention method 
was used in the amendment clauses they found a great var-
iety of safeguards. In some cases the legislatures were au-
thorized to call conventions at their will. In others, con-
ventions were to be called periodically. In still others, the 
legislatures were not permitted to call conventions but were 
authorized to submit the question to the people at any time 
as to whether a constitutional convention should be held. 
Sometimes this question was to be submitted to the people 
by the legislature at stated periods or in definite years. 
They found provisions that the work of conventions be-
came effective in some cases upon a vote of the majority of 
the people and in other cases upon a vote of a larger propor-
tion of the people; either of the total number of people vot-
ing on the proposition or of the total number of people vot-
ing at the general election. I t had been provided in some 
constitutions that constitutional conventions were them-
selves authorized to adopt and promulgate revisions or 
amendments without reference to the people. 
The people of this state in 1842 chose not to adopt for the 
amendment of their Constitution the convention method 
which was in such favor in many of the states. They selected 
the legislative proposal method and that alone. They sur-
rounded it with unusual safeguards. They required that one 
legislature should propose an amendment and that after an 
intervening election another legislature should approve the 
amendment before it should even be submitted to them. Upon 
submission, the proposed and approved amendment was to 
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have a three-fifths vote before it should become a part of the 
Constitution. 
I t is not difficult to see why the people of Rhode Island did 
not choose to adopt the convention method for the revision 
or amendment of their Constitution. They had seen the 
convention method used in all the other states and, in some 
states, on more than one occasion. They had never liked the 
convention method, however, as evidenced by the fact that 
they postponed until 1842 the holding of a convention for 
the revision of the adopted charter, decades af ter all other 
original states had adopted constitutions. 
They had the true conception of what a constitution should 
be. They kept it short and simple like the United States 
Constitution. They incorporated in i t only the fundamentals 
of government. They recognized that it might need amend-
ment but they believed that they had set up a framework of 
government which would be permanent in its essentials. They 
felt that while a constitutional convention might be desir-
able or even necessary in setting up a new constitutional 
government, it was ill adapted for the making of amend-
ments. 
Once having an established and stable government under 
their written Constitution, they could see no fur ther occa-
sion for doing the job over again. The people of Rhode Island 
felt then that while their Constitution might be amended, it 
would be a permanent instrument just as the people of the 
United States as a whole feel now, and have always felt, that 
the United States Constitution is a permanent document, to 
be amended as necessity may dictate but not to be replaced. 
The curb the people put upon themselves in the strict re-
quirements of the use of the legislative proposal method 
clearly shows that they had no liking for speed in the amend-
ment of their Constitution. If there is one thing which rec-
ommends the constitutional convention method it is its speed. 
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Before the people themselves were allowed to pass upon 
an amendment under the amendment clause which they 
adopted, they required two legislatures to act upon a pro-
posed amendment with an intervening election giving time 
for careful consideration and reconsideration. They knew 
that if the convention method were permitted, a convention 
could be called and its work completed and submitted to 
them for their consideration within two or three months, or 
even in less time. How reckless the convention method must 
have looked to them when under it a t any time on about two 
months' notice they might find themselves presented with the 
problem of expressing their will upon amendments or even 
a complete revision. 
The convention method may well have seemed to them 
dangerous because of the possibility that the delegates to a 
convention, taking the position that they were the represen-
tatives of the sovereign people, might not only propose 
amendments or revisions but might actually adopt and pro-
mulgate them. The people of Rhode Island in 1842 had ex-
amples before them in other states where this very thing had 
been done by conventions. 
I t is always the intent of the framers of this Constitution 
and of the people in adopting it, at which we are trying to 
arrive. If it were their intention to permit their Constitu-
tion to be revised or amended by a constitutional convention, 
would they not have said so, if only for the purpose of safe-
guarding themselves as carefully in the use of the constitu-
tional convention method as they did in the use of the legis-
lative proposal method? 
I t is unthinkable that they should tie their own hands so 
that they could not even have presented to them for consid-
eration a proposal emanating from the legislature until it 
had been passed upon by two legislatures with an interven-
ing election and that in addition they should require for a 
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valid expression of their will a three-fifths vote of the people 
themselves,—while at the same time they understood that 
they were leaving it entirely to the legislature as to whether 
to submit to them the question of calling a convention, as to 
when to call a convention either for a revision or amendment 
of the Constitution, leaving it entirely to the legislature or 
the convention to decide whether a revision or amendment 
should be adopted by the convention itself or submitted to 
the people and whether by a majority or other proportionate 
vote. The answer of course is clear that the people intended 
to safeguard the Constitution against their own hasty action 
and believed that they had done so by incorporating in the 
amendment clause a very stringent legislative proposal 
method—and no other! 
The people of Rhode Island knew in 1842, as they have 
known continuously since that time, that if at any time they 
should change their minds and should desire a convention, it 
could be legally and constitutionally provided for. The 
amendment clause of the Constitution is as susceptible of 
amendment as any other clause of the Constitution. 
In 1882 an amendment to the Constitution was submitted 
to the people, af ter passing two legislatures with an inter-
vening election, providing for a change in the amendment 
clause to make the calling of a constitutional convention pos-
sible under the Constitution. The people refused to adopt 
this amendment. They were still of the same mind as in 1842. 
They chose not to make the constitutional convention method 
a legal method. Furthermore, in 1898 and in 1899 the peo-
ple rejected a revised constitution containing a provision 
that every twenty years the electors should decide whether 
there should be a convention to revise the constitution. This 
is the last word of the people of Rhode Island. 
The opinion of the justices of 1883 came as no surprise 
to the people of this state. I t was an opinion which the 
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man on the street could easily understand. In his clubs, in 
his corporations, in his church societies, and in his labor and 
fraternal organizations, he knew that he looked to the 
amendment clause—and to the amendment clause only—to 
find whether the by-laws, articles of association or constitu-
tion could be amended, and how. If he found an amendment 
clause at all, he knew that what the amendment clause said 
was binding upon him and his associates. If he found that 
the instrument permitted amendments upon proposals by an 
executive committee or board of directors and upon a two-
thirds vote of the general membership—he knew that that 
was tha t ! If he found that an amendment might be made if 
proposed at one meeting of the members and acted upon at 
a fur ther meeting and then by a three-fifths vote—he knew 
that that was tha t ! I t would never occur to him that the 
amendment clauses had to state anything more than the 
permissive way or ways in which the documents could be 
amended. He knew also that if he and his associates did 
not like an amendment clause, it could be changed—by the 
method set out in the instrument. 
Therefore, when he read that the justices of the Supreme 
Court had found that the only constitutional way in which 
the Constitution of Rhode Island could be amended was in 
accordance with the legislative proposal method set out in 
the amendment clause, he read something which appealed 
to his common sense. I t was in accordance with his un-
derstanding of the purpose of amendment clauses in the 
instruments with which he was entirely familiar in his 
daily life. He did not expect to find in the amendment 
clause of the Constitution a prohibition against all other 
possible methods of amending the Constitution. He did not 
find in any of the by-laws, articles of association or consti-
tutions with which he was familiar, in addition to the 
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statement of the permissive way or ways of amending them, 
a complete statement of the prohibited ways. 
He may not have known the meaning of the Latin phrase 
used by the justices, expressio unius est exolusio alterius. 
He did know, however, that when the people said in the 
Constitution that i t might be amended by the legislative 
proposal method—that was tha t ! 
From the time of the Declaration of Independence, Amer-
ican citizens have always held that governments are insti-
tuted among men to secure their inherent, inalienable rights 
among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 
I t is no new principle that governments derive their just 
powers from the consent of the governed and that when-
ever any form of government becomes destructive of these 
rights, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it. 
Every school boy knows that. 
The people of Rhode Island reasserted in the first provi-
sion of their Constitution this right of revolution. The Ar-
ticles of Confederation were adopted af ter a bloody revolu-
tion ; the Constitution of the United States, af ter a peaceful 
revolution in passing from the Confederation to the Union. 
The State of Rhode Island was born of revolution. Our 
Revolutionary forefathers are revered, not scorned. 
This right of the people by a revolution, which may be 
peaceful or otherwise, to change their form of government 
when it ceases to preserve their inalienable rights of life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness is expressed in one 
form or another in most of the constitutions of the states. 
I t exists where it is not expressed. I t is, however, a right of 
revolution. Hence by its very nature it is outside the con-
stitution, i. e., unconstitutional. 
Section 1 of Article I of our own Constitution reads as 
follows: 
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"In the words of the Father of his Country, we de-
clare tha t the 'basis of our political systems is the right 
of the people to make and alter their constitutions of 
government; but tha t the constitution which at any 
time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic 
act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon 
a l l . ' " 
There speaks in the first clause, 
" the basis of our political systems is the right of the 
people to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment ;" 
Washington, the proud revolutionist, who had no apology 
to make to anyone for the assertion of the right of revolu-
tion. 
But there speaks in the second clause, 
"but tha t the constitution which a t any time exists, till 
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole 
people, is sacredly obligatory upon all." 
Washington, the constitutional statesman, who holds that 
the Constitution is a sacred document subject to change 
only by the people in a constitutional manner until such 
time as i t shall be scrapped by revolution. 
We cannot look to this section for authority to amend 
the Constitution in a constitutional manner. 
Whether the people of Rhode Island are ready for a 
peaceful revolution, in pursuance of the inherent right de-
clared in Article I, Section 1, in order to get rid of the 
present Constitution in whole or in part , may be a moot 
question. Even if it could be demonstrated that all the peo-
ple of the state, including the justices of this Court, are in 
favor of asserting this right of the people to scrap or amend 
the Constitution, through a constitutional convention and 
a majori ty vote of the people or otherwise, i t would still be 
the duty of the justices of this Court to advise that such 
action would be extra-constitutional and in the exercise of 
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the inalienable, inherent right of revolution to which ex-
pression is given in said Article I, Section 1. I t would be 
the duty of the justices of this Court to be the last five men 
in the state to give their judicial approval to the amendment 
of the Constitution in any other manner than that set out 
in the Constitution itself. As citizens, the justices of this 
Court might feel that the end justifies the means; as judges 
of the Supreme Court, to whom the preservation of the 
Constitution is sacredly entrusted, they cannot fail to stand 
by the Constitution. 
But it is said that constitutions of other states have re-
peatedly been changed, altered and amended by constitu-
tional conventions. In many of these states the constitu-
tional convention method is one of the methods authorized 
by the Constitutions in the amendment sections. The con-
stitutions in many of these states through repeated revi-
sions have become mere compilations of laws, containing 
hundreds of sections and tens of thousands of words. In 
these states, conventions specifically authorized by the con-
titutions have become little more than superior legislatures, 
which must be called frequently to satisfy the requirements 
of passing fads and experiments in government. 
I t is true that in some states having provisions in their 
constitutions similar to our own, conventions have been 
held. In these states, however, questions have come before 
the courts after the fact. A convention has been held and 
a new Constitution adopted. Officers have been elected un-
der the new Constitution and the new government, includ-
ing the judges of the Court, have been duly sworn to support 
the new Constitution. The government under the replaced 
Constitution has disappeared and the people have peace-
fully acquiesced. A question then arises in the new Court 
under the new Constitution as to whether the new Con-
stitution is valid and binding upon the people. The Court 
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has DO hesitation in saying that such new Constitution is 
valid. The decision could not be otherwise. 
This situation would arise in Rhode Island before this 
Court, if a convention were held and a Constitution emanat-
ing from the convention were adopted and acquiesced in by 
the people. This Court, sitting under the new Constitution 
and sworn to uphold it, would find no difficulty whatever in 
saying that the new Constitution is legal and would have no 
difficulty in recognizing a successful revolution when it saw 
one. 
If the people should acquiesce in the holding of a conven-
tion and in the adoption of a new Constitution, possibly not 
a ripple of disturbance would be observed and it might be 
very difficult for the average citizen to realize that a peace-
ful revolution had taken place. Nevertheless this would be 
the fact. The point here is that the Governor has raised the 
question before the fact and this Court has sworn to uphold 
this Constitution. 
It is interesting to observe in this connection that in every 
state but one, where the question has been raised, the dele-
gates to a constitutional convention cannot be required to 
take an oath to support the existing constitution. They are 
only required to swear to support the Constitution of the 
United States and to perform their duty as delegates faith-
fully. In the excepted state by a vote of the people when 
they authorized the calling of the convention, the delegates 
were required to take an oath to support the constitution 
of the state. I t is somewhat anomalous, to say the least, 
if the justices of this Court who are sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, can sanction the calling of a convention, the 
delegates to which cannot be forced to swear to uphold the 
Constitution! 
Rhode Island is one of only seven states in which the 
justices of the Supreme Court may be asked in advance 
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whether a proposed action is or is not constitutional. I t 
cannot be too strongly emphasized that this Court is sitting 
under our present Constitution and not under a new Con-
stitution. I t must acknowledge the fact that the people have 
the right to make or alter their Constitution as they see 
fit and set up a new government at their pleasure. "While 
recognizing this right, we believe the justices of this Court 
must say, as the justices of this Court said in 1883, that 
the only way in which the Constitution can be amended 
in a constitutional manner is by the method provided in 
Article XII I . What action the people or their representa-
tives may choose to take thereafter is no concern of this 
Court. 
I t is, therefore, submitted that it is the duty of the jus-
tices of this Court to answer the Governor's question, in all 
its parts, in the negative. 
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APPENDIX A 
Chronology Re Rhode Island Constitutional History 
Following are notes regarding events which have oc-
curred in Rhode Island constitutional history in con-
nection with the agitation for and accomplishment of 
constitutional changes from the date of the American 
Revolution to the present time. 
1776 In 1776, the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations existed and was governing itself in pursu-
ance of and in accordance with the Charter which had 
been granted to it by King Charles the Second of 
England under date of July 8, 1663. 
On May 4, 1776 the General Assembly of the Colony 
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, a t New-
port, repealed an act of allegiance to Great Britain 
theretofore adopted and voted that thereafter the name 
and authority of the King be omitted from all official 
documents and transactions and that thereafter, in 
place of the King's authority, the name and authority 
of the Governor and Company of the English Colony 
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of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations shall 
appear. 
Vol. VII Colonial Records P. 522. 
On July 18, 1776 the General Assembly at Newport, 
having learned of the passage of the Declaration of In-
dependence by the Continental Congress at Philadel-
phia on July 4th of that year approved the same and 
changed the name of the colony to "State of Rhode 
Island and Providence Plantations." 
Vol. VII Colonial Records P. 581. 
1777 At South Kingstown September 22, 1777 the Gener-
al Assembly voted that His Honor the Deputy Gover-
nor, Henry Ward, William Channing, Jonathan Ar-
nold and Rowse J . Helene, Esqs. be a committee, they, 
or the major part of them, to form a plan of govern-
ment for this State and lay the same before this As-
sembly as soon as conveniently may be. 
Vol. VI I I Colonial Records P. 304. 
1783 In February 1783 at Providence, the General As-
sembly adopted a preamble and resolution substan-
tially as follows— 
Whereas, it appears, * * * that a number of auda-
cious persons, in contempt of all authority of this 
State, and in direct violation of the laws therein ex-
isting, have attempted to subvest the present constitu-
tion; and whereas * * * etc. et. 
Vol. IX Colonial Records 635. 
N. B. We fail to find in the Colonial Records any 
earlier reference to a constitution; but, by this refer-
ence, the Charter must be intended. 
1792 At the February Session 1792 the question of order-
ing the election of delegates for a constitutional con-
vention was brought up but was referred to the next 
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1793 session. At a session of the Assembly held in 1793 the 
proposal was rejected. 
1796 At the October Session 1796 a resolution was passed 
requesting the freemen of the several towns to instruct 
their representatives during the recess of the Assembly 
on the question of calling a convention of delegates to 
frame a written constitution. 
1797 On July 4,1797, George R. Burrill made an elaborate 
argument in favor of the formation of a constitution. 
In the same year the General Assembly adopted a 
code of laws to become effective in 1798, known as the 
Digest of 1798, all other general laws being thereby re-
pealed. It included the Charter, the Declaration of 
Independence by Congress and the Acts of Ratifica-
tion. the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution of 
the United States, Washington's Farewell Address, 
and certain other acts, among which was "An Act 
Declaratory of Certain Rights of the People of This 
State." By the last named act it is enacted: 
"That the people of this state are entitled, 
among other important and essential rights, 
to the rights hereafter enumerated, and that 
the same are and hereby are declared to be the 
inherent and unquestionable rights of the 
people inhabiting within the limits and ju-
risdiction of this s tate: That the political 
axioms, or truths, hereinafter mentioned and 
declared, are, and ought to be, of paramount 
obligation in all legislative judicial and ex-
ecutive proceedings, which shall be had or 
done therein, under the authority thereof." 
Then follow ten paragraphs enumerating various rights 
which today appear in our constitution as Sec. 5-14 
inc. of Article I. Still another act was incorporated in 
digest relating to religious liberty which appears as 
Sec. 3 of Article I of our constitution. 
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From the above it is quite evident that the General 
Assembly took unto itself all the powers of government 
and acted in a sovereign capacity, except that it could 
not alter or amend the Charter or pass laws contrary 
to well recognized civil rights. The Digest of 1798 am-
ply demonstrates that for the time being the so-called 
constitution met all the requirements of the people and 
there was no sustained demand for a new constitution. 
At the October Session (1797) of the General As-
sembly a proposition to call a constitutional conven-
tion was negatived by a large majority. 
1799 A similar proposal was also rejected by the Assembly 
in 1799. 
A number of towns having instructed their represen-
tatives to endeavor to secure the passage of a resolution 
ordering a convention to form a State constitution, the 
1806 question was presented at the June, 1806, Session of 
the Assembly, but nothing was done regarding the 
matter. 
1808 Henry Wheaton in a letter, now in the Massachu-
setts Historical Society, strongly urged the adoption of 
a constitution by Rhode Island. 
1819 At the February, 1819, Session of the Assembly a 
resolution was presented in the House requesting the 
freemen at the Annual Election in April, to express 
their opinions regarding the expediency of calling a 
convention to form a written constitution. The matter 
was postponed and a committee appointed to take the 
matter into consideration. 
1820 Throughout the year 1820 the subject of a con-
stitutional convention was quite generally discussed 
throughout the state. A convention was held in Provi-
dence to further that object. 
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1821 At the January Session, 1821, a resolution was 
passed by both houses to submit the question of calling 
a constitutional convention to the people at the town 
meetings in April. 
The question presented read as follows: 
" Is i t expedient that an act be passed by 
the General Assembly providing for the elec-
tion of delegates by the freemen of the several 
towns in the same numbers and proportions 
as said towns are now represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly, and organizing said delegates 
into a convention for the purpose of forming 
a written constitution of government for this 
state, such constitution when framed to be 
submitted to the freemen for final decision?" 
The people voted against the proposal—Ayes 1619, 
Noes 1905. 
1822 The constitutional convention question again came 
up a t January Session 1822 and was again submitted 
to the freemen at the April town meetings. Again de-
feated—843 for—1804 against. 
1823 The question of a constitutional convention was a 
subject of debate all through the year 1823, both in the 
General Assembly and in the State at large. At the 
June Session 1823 a resolution was offered which pro-
vided for the issuance of a mandatory call for the elec-
tion of delegates to a constitutional convention, with-
out waiting for the previously attempted popular initi-
ative. The resolution was laid on the table until Octo-
ber when a committee was elected to bring in a bill for 
a convention. The committee was unable to agree, and 
another committee was appointed for the purpose. The 
1824 lat ter reported at the January 1824 Session. The bill 
requested the freemen to choose delegates equal to the 
then number of representatives in the House. The reso-
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lution was adopted and the freemen of the towns 
elected delegates in June (1824). 
The movement appears to have been "non partisan." 
The convention met a t Newport in June 1824 and pre-
pared a Constitution to be submitted to the people in 
October. 
The freemen rejected the proposed constitution— 
3206-1668. 
The question of a new Constitution again came to 
1834 the front in 1834. Delegates from several towns as-
sembled in Providence February 22, 1834, to consult 
on the best course to pursue for the establishment of 
a written state constitution which should properly de-
fine and fix the powers of the different departments of 
the Government and the rights of citizens. Another 
convention was held for the same purpose March 12, 
1834 at which delegates from additional towns were 
present. A constitutional party was formed and agita-
tion was continued. At the June Session of the General 
Assembly 1834 a motion was presented in the House 
to call a convention to annul the Charter. Thomas W. 
Dorr, a new member from Providence, moved as a sub-
stitute requesting the freemen to choose delegates to a 
convention to amend the present or to propose a new 
constitution. His motion was carried in an amended 
form. 
The Convention met in September 1834, adjourned 
several times, the last time to meet in Providence on 
1835 June 29, 1835, but the members failed to meet on the 
latter date. 
1837 At the January Session 1837 a resolution by Thomas 
W. Dorr to call a constitutional convention was re-
jected by a vote of 39 to 17. 
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1839 In 1839 Thomas W. Dorr, who, previously, had been 
quite prominent in the Whig party was now opposed to 
that party, as he found the Democratic party, in state 
politics, more favorable to the suffrage movement. 
In the fall of the year 1840 the R. I. Suffrage Asso-
ciation was formed. It maintained the right of the 
people to meet by delegates and form a constitution, 
without regard to the absence of authority for such 
proceedings in the terms of the Charter. 
1841 At the January Session of 1841 a resolution was 
adopted requesting the freemen at the August town 
and ward meetings to choose delegates, equal in num-
ber to the representation of the several municipalities 
in the General Assembly, to attend a convention to be 
held in Providence on the first Monday of November 
1841 to frame a new constitution, either in whole or in 
part, and if in part, to take into "special consideration 
the expediency of equalizing the representation of the 
towns in the house of representatives." The resolution 
passed 37-16. 
As the convention so called by the General Assembly 
was to be elected by the "freemen," the advocates of 
"reform" or "suffragists" called a mass meeting of the 
friends of extended suffrage to meet in Providence 
April 17, 1841. The meeting was held. Another was 
held at Newport May 5, 1841. The Newport meeting 
adjourned to Providence July 5, 1841 to observe Inde-
pendence Day (July 4th falling on Sunday). 
At the meeting of July 5 resolutions were adopted 
ordering the calling of a Convention to frame a consti-
tution. On July 24, 1841 the state committee of the 
people issued a call for the election of delegates to a 
convention to meet in Providence October 4. 
On August 28 delegates were elected. 
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Three days later, August 31, at the regular town 
meetings, delegates were elected to the convention 
which had been called by the General Assembly at the 
January (1841) Session. 
The convention called as the result of the July 5th 
meeting of the people was called the "People's Conven-
tion," that called by the General Assembly was called 
the "Landholders Convention." 
The Peoples Convention convened a t the State 
House in Providence on October 4, 1841 and a form of 
constitution was adopted known as the "Peoples Con-
stitution." 
The Landholders Committee met at the State House 
on November 1, 1841 and adopted a form of constitu-
tion known as the "Landholders Constitution." 
A vote was taken on the question of the adoption of 
the Peoples Constitution on December 27, 28, 29, 1841. 
The method of voting and the persons allowed to vote 
had been arbitrarily established by the Peoples Con-
vention. The result of the vote was 13944 for 52 
against the adoption. The advocates of the Peoples 
Constitution claimed that the affirmative vote repre-
sented a majority of the enlarged suffrage which they 
had established and that the vote included a majority 
of those who were legal voters under the Charter Gov-
ernment and therefore declared that their constitution 
had been adopted. 
1842 At the January 1842 Session of the General Assem-
bly (under the Charter) a resolution was introduced 
providing for the acceptance of the Peoples Constitu-
tion. The resolution failed of passage by a vote of 11 
to 57. A resolution was then offered condemning the 
action of the Peoples Convention and carried by a vote 
of 60 to 7. 
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On January 13, by order of the Peoples Convention 
a proclamation was issued declaring that the Peoples 
Constitution had been adopted. 
In February 1842 the Landholders Convention re-
convened and revised the form of its proposed consti-
tution by making provisions for an enlarged electorate 
and voted to submit its constitution, as so revised, to 
popular vote on March 21, 22, 23, 1842. 
Prior to the vote on the question the members of the 
Supreme Court, Ex-Governors and other public officers 
and prominent private persons publicly gave their 
opinions that the Peoples Convention was unlawful 
and revolutionary. The advocates of the Peoples Con-
stitution were supported by the opinions of a Justice 
of the U. S. Court and of nine Democratic lawyers in 
the contention that the Peoples Convention was legal 
and that the constitution submitted by it had been 
legally adopted. 
Dorr and his adherents insisted that the Peoples 
Constitution had been adopted and advocated the re-
jection of the Landholders Constitution. 
I t was rejected by a vote of 8689 to 8013. 
A special session of the General Assembly had been 
called to meet in March 1842 and, at that Session, af ter 
the rejection of the Landholders Constitution a motion 
was made that the Peoples Constitution be submitted 
to a vote of the freeholders which motion was lost 3 to 
53. 
The Peoples Constitution having been adopted ac-
cording to the claim of the "suffragists" and the Land-
holders Constitution having been rejected by the elec-
torate and the government as existing under the Char-
ter refusing to admit or recognize any effect or validity 
in the Peoples Constitution a seriously disturbed con-
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dition existed. The suffragists, acting upon their con-
tention that the Peoples Constitution was in effect, 
arranged for the election of general officers and a leg-
islation under that "constitution." The "election" was 
held April 18, 1842 and a full complement of officers 
was "elected." 
The regular election of State Officers under the 
Charter was held on April 20, 1842 and a full comple-
ment of officers was elected. 
Each group of officers claimed to be the duly consti-
tutional officials of the State with the inevitable result 
of clashes of authority, including overt acts of vio-
lence. This condition continued in varying but dimin-
ishing degrees until April, 1843. 
In the meantime, at the June 1842 Session of the 
Charter General Assembly, a resolution was passed 
calling for another constitutional convention. Such a 
convention was held at East Greenwich September to 
November 5, 1842 when its work of framing a consti-
tution was completed. The document prepared by that 
convention was submitted to the electorate on Novem-
ber 21, 22, 23, 1842 and adopted by a vote of 7032 to 
59. This is the constitution which, with sundry amend-
ments, continues in force at the present time (1935). 
An election under the constitution so adopted in 
November, 1842 was held in April, 1843, and in May of 
that year, at Newport, the Government under that con-
stitution was inaugurated and the government under 
the Charter which had been in continual existence for 
180 years ceased to be. 
The "suffragists" in large measure submitted to or 
acquiesced in the situation, although to some extent 
and from time to time thereafter agitation for fur ther 
constitutional changes has been continued resulting in 
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the amendments which have become part of the funda-
mental law of the State. 
Such agitation, in addition to bringing about the 
adoption of those amendments, led to the submission 
of other amendments which were not adopted to pro-
posals in the General Assembly for calling constitu-
tional conventions which were defeated and occasioned 
other legislative action, also expressions of judicial 
opinion relative to the manner by which amendments 
might lawfully be effected. References to some of the 
events which occurred af ter the adoption of the Con-
stitution follow. 
1853 At the May Session 1853 a resolution was adopted 
requesting the freemen of the several municipalities to 
vote, on June 28, for or against a constitutional con-
vention, and at the same time to elect delegates to such 
a convention. The proposition was defeated by a vote 
of 6282 to 4570. 
At the October Session in the same year the General 
Assembly passed an act providing for the submission 
to the people of certain questions connected with a 
constitutional convention. At an election held Novem-
ber 21, 1853 the questions were answered in the nega-
tive by a vote of 3778 for, to 7618 against. 
1881 At the General Assembly which was elected in 1881 
an amendment to the constitution was proposed which, 
if adopted would have conferred upon the Assembly 
the authority to provide for calling conventions to 
revise, alter or amend the constitution and to submit 
the actions of such convention to the electors for ap-
proval or rejection. 
The proposed amendment was approved by the next 
Assembly which was elected in 1882 and was submitted 
to the electors in November of that year. 
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The amendment was rejected by a vote of 4393 ap-
proving and 5125 rejecting. 
1883 In 1883 the justices of the Supreme Court were asked 
to give an advisory opinion regarding the method or 
methods by which the constitution might legally be 
amended. In response the justices advised that amend-
ments might be effected only in the manner prescribed 
in the constitution and not by means of a convention. 
See 14 R. I. 651. 
1897 At the May Session 1897 an act was passed provid-
ing for a commission of fifteen members to revise the 
constitution. The commission which was appointed 
under the act reported a revised document in February 
1898 1898. The General Assembly (January Session 1898) 
adopted the same as a proposed amendment to the 
constitution. I t was likewise adopted at the May Ses-
sion 1898 and submitted to the people in November of 
that year but failed to receive a sufficient vote of ap-
proval, the voting being 17360 for and 13510 against. 
1899 With slight changes the document was again sub-
mitted to the people in June 1899 and again was re-
jected, the vote being 4097 for and 12742 against. 
C O M M E N T S 
The foregoing brief references to the constitutional his-
tory of Rhode Island are here included principally for the 
purpose of disclosing the conditions which existed in 1841-
43 at the times when the "Peoples," the "Landholders" and 
the now existing constitutions were framed, the history 
which had preceded that period of time and the keen appre-
ciation which the authors of those documents must have 
had of the very proposition which is now involved in the 
question or questions which have been submitted for the 
opinion and advice of your Honors. 
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In the first place it is pertinent to observe that the three 
documents vary, one from the others, only in a few partic-
lars and that these variations are relatively unimportant 
and that none of the variations affect the present inquiry, 
in any great degree. 
I t is plain that in 1841-43 the most important differences 
of opinion in regard to the provisions which should be in-
corporated in a constitution were in relation to the exten-
sion of the suffrage and the proportionate representation of 
the several towns in the General Assembly. 
The fundamental point of difference between the contend-
ing parties (a difference of much greater importance than 
any difference regarding the provisions which should be 
included in a constitution) related to the method and pro-
cedure by which a constitution could be adopted, particu-
larly the question—what inhabitants of the State had the 
right to take part in bringing about such adoption and the 
course which they should pursue in order to obtain their 
desires. 
With the knowledge that that paramount issue was ever 
present and ever would be present in the future when agita-
tion for constitutional changes might arise, and that that 
issue had been the subject of persistent and acrimonious 
discussion and absolute differences of conviction for many 
years, it is inconceivable that either Dorr and his followers 
on the one hand, or those who held opposing views on the 
other hand, should have, intentionally or by oversight, omit-
ted from the constitutions which they prepared, positive pro-
visions with reference to the rights of "the people" to 
initiate changes in the future if they or any of them had 
intended that, af ter the adoption of a constitution, the people 
should have any right to initiate amendments in any man-
ner except as specifically provided. I t cannot be that either 
party intended to leave to inference a right which was then 
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such a vital issue if it was their purpose that that right could 
be exercised or claimed in later years. 
Nevertheless none of the documents contains a provision 
either specifically reserving such right to the people or con-
ferring such right upon the people or any provision denying 
such right, but each document does specifically provide for 
amendments to be initiated by the Assembly. The provisions 
in the three constitutions (Article X I I I in each) are essen-
tially the same with the exception that the Peoples Consti-
tution provides that amendments when finally approved by 
a majority of the voters, shall become effective, whereas the 
other documents provide that approval by three-fifths of the 
voters shall be necessary. 
Particularly it is most significant that a provision ex-
pressly and definitely saving and reserving a right of revi-
sion and amendment to the people is omitted from the 
Peoples Constitution, a document of which Dorr was un-
doubtedly the principal author, and which was unqualifiedly 
approved by his followers, and in the defence of the princi-
ples of which he incurred dangers, imprisonment and other 
hardships. 
The principles upon which the Peoples Convention pro-
ceeded when it assembled to draf t the constitution which was 
later submitted to the people were these—namely that, as no 
provision for changing the fundamental law then existed and 
as no power to change that law then existed except in the 
people, they (the people) had the right to effect such changes 
as they desired. 
Those principles were clearly stated by Dorr in an address 
which he made to the convention, but he also emphasized the 
proposition "When there is a mode of amendment provided 
by the constitution of a State, it ought to be followed." 
Following are his words as quoted from Burke's Report, 
page 863. (Burke's report to the National House of Repre-
sentatives 28th Congress, 1st Session, 1844.) 
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"The charter contains no clause of amendment; 
because the power to amend resided in the king, 
who granted it by his 'especial grace, certain knowl-
edge and mere motion.' Neither the people at large 
in this State, nor the freeholding people, have ever 
adopted a Constitution; and of course, they have 
prescribed no mode of amendment. The Assembly 
have never passed any general law providing the 
mode of procedure to amend the government. They 
have only made requests from time to time, which 
have never been complied with, except by the con-
vening of delegates to receive their pay. And fur-
ther, there is no usage in this State which points 
out the mode of amendment. The clear conclusion 
therefore is. that the people of this State, whoever 
they are, have a right to proceed to amend their 
government, without a call, in just such manner 
and time as they may see fit; and I have endeavored 
to show that the people are the citizens in general, 
the successors to the former sovereign of Rhode 
Island." 
"So far, therefore, from our proceeding being ir-
regular or revolutionary, they are strictly in order, 
and in conformity with the will of the people, and 
could not be strengthened by any possible form of 
request from the present government. Where there 
is a mode of amendment prescribed by the constitu-
tion of a State, it ought to be followed. But suppose 
the constitution of a State—of Massachusetts, for 
instance—were silent on this one point, and pre-
scribed no way to proceed. I ask, who would have 
the power to amend that constitution, The electors 
named in it, No; for all the subjects upon which 
they can vote are specified in the instrument. The 
legislature: No, for this is not named among their 
powers. The only remaining alternative is, that the 
people at large, the source of all power, have the 
right to amend the government, as they originally 
had the right to make it." [Italics ours] 
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I t may be urged, as it has been at times in the past, that 
under each of the constitutions (i. e. the Peoples and the one 
which was adopted and is now in force), and notwithstand-
ing the omission of positive provisions, the right of the peo-
ple to effect changes independently of those which may be 
initiated by the Assembly as provided in Article X I I I of 
each document were nevertheless declared, saved and re-
served, with the right, by inference, to effect such changes 
without following the method prescribed in the constitution. 
The ground for such contention is found, in the case of the 
Peoples Constitution, in section 3 of Article I (Declaration 
of Principles and Rights) which reads as follows: 
"the people have an unalienable and indefeasible 
right, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited 
capacity to ordain and institute government, and in 
the same capacity to alter, reform, or totally change 
the same whenever their safety or happiness re-
quires." 
and in the case of the present existing constitution is found 
in Section 1 of Article I (Declaration of Certain Constitu-
tional Rights and Principles) which reads as follows: 
"We declare that the basis of our political systems 
is the right of the people to make and alter their 
constitutions of government; but that the constitu-
tion which at any time exists, till changed by an ex-
plicit and authentic act of the whole people, is 
sacredly obligatory upon all." 
I t is understood that when the draft ing of the present 
constitution was under consideration in the convention a 
proposal was made that the above quoted statement from the 
Peoples Constitution be included, but that the proposal was 
rejected in favor of the statement last above reported. The 
last quoted clause is significant and the reason for its adop-
tion is self-apparent. 
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I t will be noted that neither of the constitutions contains 
any provision setting forth any method or procedure whereby 
the declared right of the people may be exercised, except only 
as is provided in Article X I I I of each document (the method 
which involves Legislative initiative). There is no provision 
for or suggestion of a right to effect changes by means of a 
convention. 
The failure to include any provision expressly permitting 
amendments to be initiated by the convention method or 
provision asserting the right of the people to act on their 
own initiative constitutes (in the light of the agitation and 
discussions which had preceded and in view of the tran-
scendent importance of the subject) cogent evidence that 
Dorr and his followers, as well as the citizens who approved 
the Landholders Constitution and the constitution which is 
now in force, intended and unanimously agreed that the 
right of the people to thereafter constitutionally change their 
fundamental law should be safeguarded and restrained by 
limiting the exercise of that right to the method which was 
similarly set forth in each of the three constitutions. 
The leaders of each of the factions engaged in the strug-
gle for constitutional reform were men of intelligence and 
convictions, including many lawyers whose records disclose 
their great ability both in debate and in the draughtsman-
ship of documents. It is not possible that such men, at such 
a time and under the conditions which then prevailed, would 
have failed, when preparing the documents which were to 
be submitted to the people for adoption as constitutions, to 
include explicit provisions enabling the people constitution-
ally to amend by the convention method as well as by the 
prescribed method, if it had been the intention to give con-
stitutional effect to such right. Neither is it possible that 
the people would have adopted as their constitution a docu-
ment from which a provision unequivocally enabling the 
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exercise of such right was omitted, if they (the people) in-
tended to exercise such right under the constitution. 
Any draughtsman of ordinary ability and experience, in-
tending to give constitutional effect to a right of amendment 
greater than that which is expressed would have added to 
the statements of "Declaration of Rights and Principles" the 
words—"and such right, in addition to the exercise thereof 
in the manner which is provided in Article X I I I of this Con-
stitution, may be exercised by the people by means of con-
ventions called for the purpose or in any other manner which 
they may from time to time determine." 
The omission of such a declaration is of profound and con-
clusive significance. 
Furthermore, how can either of the above quoted state-
ments (Sec. 3 of Art. I of the Peoples Constitution and Sec. 
1 of Art, I of the present constitution) be construed as en-
abling the people to exercise any broader, greater or differ-
ent right and power to change their constitution than is 
provided for in the thirteenth articles of those constitutions? 
If the provisions of Article X I I I in each constitution are not 
intended to be restrictive on the people themselves for what 
purpose are they included? If the people, by convention 
or by any manner other than as provided in Article XI I I , can 
lawfully change their fundamental charter of government 
and override the requirements of that provision, to what end 
and for what purpose was that article included? The answer 
must be—None—It is an idle, useless and ineffectual addi-
tion to a solemn and important document. 
As no change proposed by the Assembly can become effec-
tive until approved by the people, it is manifest that the 
purpose of the other provisions contained in Article X I I I is 
to assure a reasonable period of delay, a period for considera-
tion and reconsideration, in order to avoid hasty and ill con-
sidered action and it is also apparent that it was the inten-
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tion of the people, in adopting their constitution, that they 
desired and intended to limit the exercise of their consti-
tutional right in the manner specified. 
In addition to all the foregoing considerations, it has been 
positively and affirmatively demonstrated that the people do 
not desire that revision or amendments shall be effected by 
means of conventions. 
A definite proposal to amend the present constitution by 
adding a specific provision for such conventions was submit-
ted to the people in the year 1882 as hereinbefore stated. 
That proposal was rejected by a vote 4393 for and 5125 
against, a total vote of 9518 on the question. 
That vote was taken in November, 1882. At the election 
for general officers that same year a total vote of 15523 was 
cast for the candidates for governor. 
Therefore it is apparent that only 61% of the electorate 
which voted for the candidates for governor was interested 
in the question of the proposed constitutional amendment, 
and that only slightly more than 28% of the electorate was 
in favor of the change, while 33% of the electorate was defin-
itely opposed. 
The suggestion has been made that the provision for 
amendments contained in Article X I I I permits the Assem-
bly to initiate only incidental or partial changes and does 
not confer power to suggest complete revision. We submit 
that no such limitation of power was intended but that the 
term "amendments" is used in its most comprehensive sense 
which includes adding, changing, substituting or omitting, 
that a comprehensive revision would be an "amendment" and 
that it was the intent and purpose of "the people" that the 
ample method for effecting amendments which is provided 
in the article should be the comprehensive and exclusive 
constitutional method of effecting whatever changes might 
appear desirable in the course of time. 
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I t cannot be that the framers of the constitution intended 
to safeguard the fundamental rights of the people against 
partial changes and at the same time leave those rights ex-
posed to sweeping changes and obliteration without, at least, 
equal protection against hasty action. 
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State of Rhode Island 
SUPREME COURT 
IN .RE: 
REQUEST OF GOVERNOR FOR AN OPINION 
Brief Submitted by Counsel Delegated by the Rhode 
Island Bar Association as Amici Curiae by Leave of 
Court in Opposition to the Legislative Power and Au-
thority of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode 
Island to Call a Convention to Revise or Amend the 
Constitution. 
Acting under the provisions of Section 2 of Article X I I 
of Amendments to the Constitution, the Governor has re-
quested the opinion of this Court on the following questions 
of law: 
I. STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power 
if the General Assembly should provide by law 
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend 
the Constitution of the State; 
" (b ) that the Governor shall call for the election, at 
a date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such conven-
tion in such number and manner as the General As-
sembly shall determine; 
" (c ) that the General Officers of the State shall by 
virtue of their offices be members of such convention; 
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such con-
vention ; 
" (e ) for the submission to the people, for their rati-
fication and adoption, of any constitution or amend-
ments proposed by such convention ; and 
372 
" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote 
a majority of the electors voting upon the question 
of such ratification and adoption?" 
With the approval of the Court the Executive Committee 
of the Rhode Island Bar Association has appointed two at-
torneys to present the affirmative and two the negative sides 
of these questions, and this brief is presented by the under-
signed in support of the view that all of the questions sub-
mitted ought to be answered in the negative. 
I t is not clear whether the six questions are in effect a 
unit, or separate and independent questions, and they will be 
considered both as independent questions and also as parts 
of a single plan, i. e., as the initial and successive steps in a 
single suggested method of revision. The meaning of the 
questions in this particular should be interpreted by the 
Court. (See infra, IV, page 68.) 
Whether considered together or separately, however, the 
exact meaning of question (a) and the answer to be given to 
it is vital, since all of the following questions are dependent 
upon its answer. Most of them, indeed, can be construed in 
no other way as they refer repeatedly to "such convention," 
i. e., the convention referred to in question (a) . 
We therefore address ourselves first to the question pro-
pounded as follows: 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power 
if the General Assembly should provide by law 
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend 
the Constitution of the State;" 
II. QUESTION (a) SHOULD BE ANSWERED 
IN THE NEGATIVE 
A. Historical Background to 1843 
As other briefs are to be filed on the same side, in which 
we understand a relatively full history of the constitutional 
government of the State will be set forth, we shall not at-
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tempt to cover the same ground in complete detail, but will 
confine ourselves to pointing out the most salient historical 
facts bearing upon the questions at issue. 
The Royal Charter of 1663 (with a brief intermission dur-
ing the Andros administration) and with formal changes 
made necessary by the State's Declaration of Independence 
on May 4, 1776, was the supreme law of the Colony and State 
until the adoption of the present Constitution in 1842— 
which became effective in the spring of 1843. After said 
Declaration of Independence, it was repeatedly referred to 
as the "Constitution." (See, for example, preamble and res-
olution of the General Assembly of February, 1783, Volume 
IX, Colonial Records, 635.) 
In 1777, the General Assembly appointed a committee to 
form a plan of government, without definite results. In 1792, 
a proposal to elect delegates to a constitutional convention 
was postponed. In 1797 a proposal to call a constitutional 
convention was defeated in the Assembly, and occasionally 
thereafter similar proposals were made. 
In 1821, however, the first resolution was passed to sub-
mit the question of calling a constitutional convention to the 
people, but the proposal was defeated by the people. Again 
in 1822 it was submitted to the freemen and was again de-
feated. 
In 1824, pursuant to act of the General Assembly calling 
a constitutional convention, such a convention met and pre-
pared a Constitution which was rejected by popular vote. 
This was the first constitutional convention in this State. 
In 1834, as a result of continued agitation, the Assembly 
issued a second call for a convention, which met but finally 
adjourned without definite action. 
In 1837, a resolution proposed by Thomas W. Dorr to call 
a convention was rejected by the Assembly. 
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In 1841, the General Assembly issued its third call for a 
constitutional convention, resulting in the holding of a third 
constitutional convention known as the "Freemen's" or 
"Landholders' " Convention. Meanwhile, in August, 1841, 
pursuant to a call issued by the Dorr faction through its 
State committee, delegates were elected to the so-called "Peo-
ple's Convention", which met in October 1841 and framed 
the "People's Constitution", upon which a vote was taken 
in December with the following result : 
In January, 1842, a resolution was introduced into the 
General Assembly to provide for the acceptance of the Peo-
ple's Constitution, which failed of passage. 
In March, 1842, the Freemen's Constitution was rejected 
by the following vote: 
After the Dorr faction organized the government under 
the alleged "People's Convention", there followed for some 
months a period during which there were two purported 
forms of government, (1) under the Charter, and (2) under 
the People's Constitution, each of which considered the 
other unlawful. This situation resulted in the clash of au-
thority known as the "Dorr War". 
During that period, the General Assembly elected under 
the Charter provided by resolution for calling another con-
stitutional convention which was duly held, actually framed 
our present Constitution, and submitted i t to the electors in 
















The Constitution framed by the People's Convention and 
the Constitution framed by the Freemen's Convention both 
included an Article XIII in all essential respects like the 
present Article XIII, except that that adopted by the Peo-
ple's Convention provided for ratification by the people by a 
majority instead of by a three-fifths vote. All three Consti-
tutions omitted any article or clause providing for amend-
ment through the means of a convention. And Mr. Dorr him-
self, in an address which he made to the People's Convention, 
stated that 
"Where there is a mode of amendment prescribed by 
the Constitution of a State, it ought to be followed." 
(See Burke's Report to The National House of Representa-
tives, Twenty-eighth Congress, First Session, 1844.) 
The question as to the manner in which the present Con-
stitution can properly be amended has, from time to time, 
been the subject of extended controversy, although, after the 
rendition by the Supreme Court of the Opinion of the 
Judges in re Constitutional Convention in 1883, reported in 
14 R. I. 649, and the gradual dying down of the heated dis-
cussions and exchanges of pamphlets which immediately 
followed, we believe it fair to say that the matter was, for a 
substantial period of time, considered to have been finally 
settled in this State. About ten years ago, however, a group 
of twenty-six prominent Democratic lawyers prepared a brief 
in support of their opinion that a constitutional convention 
could still legally be held. I t is important, however, in this 
connection to note that emphasis was laid upon the pro-
priety of submitting the question of the calling of such a 
convention to the people, rather than of having it called 
directly by the General Assembly. 
As a result of the lengthy and comprehensive arguments, 
pro and con, at the various times when these questions were 
under serious discussion, the ground has been pretty thor-
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oughly covered; and we are left to face the fact that there 
are two schools of thought upon the fundamental question 
here involved which it appears impossible to reconcile. Yet 
both cannot be right in the legal and constitutional sense; 
and it is for us to lay before the Court what, in our judg-
ment, is the constitutional law of this State as established 
by the history of the controversy, by the principles which are 
involved, and by the precedents which have been established. 
For a period of ninety-two years, i. e. since the adoption 
of our present Constitution, this State is without any prece-
dent from which it can be argued that the legal answer to 
the first question propounded is "Yes". Not once from 1843 
until the present hour has the General Assembly passed an 
act or resolution to call a constitutional convention. The 
period mentioned comprises more than half of the whole time 
during which we have existed as a State. 
Prior to 1843, as above indicated, there were frequent at-
tempts to provide for a new Constitution through the use of 
the convention method. That course was natural and indeed 
necessary. The Royal Charter having been granted by the 
King of course provided no machinery for its amendment 
by the people, and if it was to be amended it must be ex nec-
essitate through the calling of such a convention. That was, 
we believe, the normal procedure adopted in all of the thir-
teen original States, except in one or two cases where consti-
tutions were actually imposed upon the people by their ex-
isting representative bodies. At all events, by 1840 it was 
the recognized mode in which constitutions were to be estab-
lished in the absence of any prescribed mode for amendment 
in their fundamental law, and in this State, besides the "Peo-
ple's Convention" of 1842, there had been called and con-
vened three earlier constitutional conventions without any 
new constitution having been adopted. From 1824 on, the 
question was a burning one and the agitation continued, cul-
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minating in the three separate conventions in 1841-1842 
(People's, Freemen's, and Final) and the major political dis-
turbance occasioned by the Dorr War. 
Said Final Convention, held in 1842, framed our present 
Constitution which was ratified by a majority of the electors 
who voted thereon. I t was prepared by men who were the 
leaders in the political life of the State, including the late 
William P. Sheffield of Newport, who had served on a com-
mittee to which had previously been referred various memo-
rials and petitions praying that a convention be called. 
B. Consideration of Articles I, IV said XIII 
of the Constitution 
In that Constitution there were three Articles which both 
sides usually concede have the most direct bearing upon our 
question. They are these: 
"ARTICLE I . 
"SECTION 1. In the words of the Father of his Coun-
try, we declare that 'the basis of our political systems 
is the right of the people to make and alter their con-
stitutions of government; but that the constitution 
which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and 
authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory 
upon all.' 
"ARTICLE I V . 
"SECTION 1 . This constitution shall be the supreme 
law of the state, and any law inconsistent therewith 
shall be void. . . . 
"SEC. 2. The legislative power under this constitu-
tion shall be vested in two houses, the one to be called 
the senate, the other the house of representatives; and 
both together the general assembly. . . . 
"SEC. 10. The general assembly shall continue to ex-
ercise the powers which they have heretofore exercised, 
unless prohibited in this constitution. 
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"ARTICLE X I I I . 
"OF Amendments. 
"The general assembly may propose amendments to 
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the 
members elected to each house. Such propositions for 
amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and 
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary 
of state, with the names of all the members who shall 
have voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the 
town and city clerks in the state. The said propositions 
shall be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or 
notices by them issued, for warning the next annual 
town and ward meetings in Apri l ; and the clerks shall 
read said propositions to the electors when thus as-
sembled, with the names of all the representatives and 
senators who shall have voted thereon, with the yeas 
and nays, before the election of senators and repre-
sentatives shall be had. If a majority of all the mem-
bers elected to each house, a t said annual meeting, shall 
approve any proposition thus made, the same shall be 
published and submitted to the electors in the mode 
provided in the act of approval; and if then approved 
by three-fifths of the electors of the state present and 
voting thereon in town and ward meetings, it shall 
become a part of the constitution of the state." 
Now on the face of things it would look as though, if the 
Constitution were to be amended, the mode of such amend-
ment was specifically pointed out; that it was the intention 
of the framers and the people that while it could be changed 
(i. e., amended or revised) any change must have the approv-
al of two succeeding legislatures, intervening publication, 
and final approval by three-fifths of the electors; and that 
this method is exclusive upon the ancient and well recognized 
principle, in Roman and subsequent jurisprudence that "ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius." If that doctrine is prop-
erly applicable the convention method is prohibited. 
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1. In re the Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 
649, and resulting discussion. 
As everyone knows, that was the precise point passed upon 
by the Supreme Court in its advisory opinion In Re The 
Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649 (March 30, 1883). 
The Senate, by resolution, requested an answer to two ques-
tions : 
"I . As to the legal competency thereof under the 
Constitution of the State to call upon the electors to 
elect members to constitute a convention to frame a new 
Constitution of the State, and to provide that the new 
Constitution should be submitted for adoption, either 
to the qualified electors of the State, or to the persons 
who would be entitled to vote under said new Consti-
tution, for adoption, and if a majority of such electors 
or persons voting should vote in favor thereof, whether 
the new Constitution would then become the legally 
adopted Constitution of the State and be binding as 
such upon all of the people thereof. 
" I I . As to whether it is legally competent for the 
General Assembly to submit to the qualified electors 
the question whether said electors will call a conven-
tion to frame a new Constitution, and to provide by 
law if a majority of the electors voting upon said ques-
tion shall vote in favor of calling such convention, that 
the same be held, and the new Constitution framed by 
said Convention be submitted to the electors for their 
adoption, either to the electors qualified by law, or to 
the persons who may be qualified to vote under such 
new Constitution, and whether if a majority of the 
electors, or persons voting thereon, vote for the adoption 
of such Constitution, whether the Constitution so to be 
framed and adopted would be the legal Constitution 
of the State, and as such be binding upon all the people 
thereof." 
In a reply, written by Chief Justice Thomas Durfee, and 
in which Justices Matteson, Stiness, Tillinghast and Car-
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penter, the other four members of the Court, concurred, it 
was ruled that the specified mode of amendment was exclu-
sive, and that therefore it could be amended in no other way, 
the Court saying: 
" I t is inconceivable to us that they (our ancestors) 
would have elaborated so guarded a mode of amend-
ment unless they had intended to have it exclusive and 
controlling. They doubtless did so intend, and if they 
did, we cannot say they did not, simply because since 
then the Constitutions of other States, having similar 
provisions, have been amended through the medium of 
conventions. . . . Our Constitution is, by its own 
express declaration, the supreme law of the State; any 
law inconsistent with it is void, and, therefore, if the 
provision which it contains for i ts own amendment is 
exclusive, implying a prohibition of amendments in any 
other manner, then, of course, any act of the assembly 
providing for a convention to amend the Constitution 
is unconstitutional and void" (page 653). 
At page 651, the Court also says, by way of direct answer 
to the two questions, the following: 
"In reply we have to say tha t we are of opinion that 
the mode provided in the Constitution for the amend-
ment thereof is the only mode in which i t can be con-
stitutionally amended. The ordinary rule is that where 
power is given to do a thing in a particular way, there 
the affirmative words, marking out the particular way, 
prohibit all other ways by implication, so that the par-
ticular way is the only way in which the power can be 
legally executed" 
and cites various cases in support of this general principle. 
To the claim that the rule is inapplicable in the interpre-
tation of State Constitutions, the Court says: 
"The rule is simply a guide to the meaning of 
language when used in a particular way, and we do not 
see why it is not as trustworthy a guide to the meaning 
when the language so used occurs in the State Consti-
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tution, as when it occurs in a statute or a will. Men 
do not put away their spontaneous and habitual modes 
of expressing themselves merely because they are en-
gaged in the unaccustomed work of framing or adopting 
a constitution," 
citing Opinion of the Justices} 6 Cush. (Mass.) 573 (1833) 
in which, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Shaw, it 
was declared that the Constitution of Massachusetts was con-
stitutionally amendable only as therein provided. After 
stating that the provision for amendment in our Constitu-
tion is "singularly explicit," the Court says that 
"Evidently the purpose was to ensure the calm and 
considerate action of both the assembly and the people. 
I t was to pass two assemblies, so that the members of the 
second, elected af ter publication, might, if the electors 
thought proper, be elected especially to consider it. 
The popular mind was not to be taken by surprise or to 
be carried away by any sudden whim, but it was to 
act deliberately af ter reflection. To this end the three-
fifths vote was required for approval. The object was 
not to hamper or baffle the popular will, but to ensure 
its full expression. Our ancestors well knew, what we 
all know, that in spite of all precautions a majority 
may be worked up for an occasion which is not a true 
and permanent majority. 
". . . If ," the Court says, "the provision for amend-
ment was impracticable, there might be, if no legal 
reason, yet some excuse for disregarding it, but it is 
practicable, as a successful resort to it in several in-
stances has demonstrated. The only things which can 
be said against it are that it is dilatory and that it re-
quires the assent of more than a bare majority. But 
these are the very things which recommended it to its 
authors and therefore they cannot be alleged as reasons 
for believing that they did not mean it to be exclusive 
and controlling." 
And the Court well points out, in answer to an argument 
that a convention is in any event proper where general 
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changes are to be made, that in view of the requirements of 
the Federal Constitution and since the present Constitution 
contains the great ground plan of any such form of govern-
ment as can be recognized as proper thereunder, 
"Any new Constitution . . . which a convention 
would form would be a new Constitution only in name; 
but would be, in fact, our present Constitution amend-
ed. I t is impossible for us to imagine any alteration 
consistent with a republican form of government, which 
cannot be effected by specific amendment as provided in 
the Constitution." 
The Court holds that Section 10 of Article IV, authorizing 
the General Assembly to exercise the powers heretofore exer-
cised, does not save the matter, for under that Section they 
can exercise only powers which are not prohibited, and that 
therefore, as the calling of a convention is prohibited by im-
plication, the power cannot be exercised. Citing Taylor vs. 
Place, 4 R. I. 324. 
As to a contention which has often been made, and which 
may be made in this case that 
"there is a great unwritten common law of the States 
which existed before the Constitution and which the 
Constitution was powerless to modify or abolish, under 
which the people have the right, whenever invited by 
the General Assembly, to alter and amend their Con-
stitution." 
the Court says: 
"If there be any such law, for there is no record of it, 
or of any legislation or custom in this State recognizing 
it, then it is, in our opinion, rather a law, if law it can 
be called, of revolutionary than of constitutional 
change. Our Constitution is, as is already stated by 
its own terms 'the supreme law of this State.' We 
know of no law, except the constitution and laws of the 
United States, which is superior to it." 
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Almost at once this opinion became the target for heated 
criticisms. Every argument upon which the Court proceeded 
was attacked and it was even suggested that the six-day 
period during which the Court had the matter under con-
sideration must have been insufficient for proper reflection. 
I t was also pointed out that the opinion did not carry the 
same authority as a decision in a litigated case because it 
did not constitute a judicial precedent binding upon the 
Court in the ordinary sense. The latter point is conceded, 
and so far as we know has never been the subject of serious 
dispute. 
The criticism of the time element, however, was both un-
fair and unjustifiable. The question was not a new one in 
the State. Judge Durfee, in his brilliant monograph, pub-
lished in 1884, entitled "Some Thoughts on the Constitution 
of Rhode Island" (Sidney S. Rider, 1884), and which con-
stitutes a scholarly and comprehensive justification, were it 
needed, of the opinion, states that the matter had been 
brought to his attention thirty years before by the then Chief 
Justice Richard W. Greene, who had denounced proceedings 
in New York to "amend the Constitution of New York 
through the medium of a convention without following the 
method prescribed in it," and adds that the Opinion had the 
assent of all five Judges and was not precipitate. We may 
add what everyone knows, that Judge Durfee was one of the 
very greatest Judges whom this State has ever produced. 
Probably Chief Justice Ames alone was his peer. 
From that time to the present, when the matter has been 
under discussion, it has been fashionable for the opposition 
to make little of the application of the principle that expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius. But looked at in its historical 
light, no rule of interpretation could be more sensible. In 
this State, prior to 1843, convention and constitution making 
were matters under almost constant discussion. That was the 
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recognized mode in which constitutions were to be initiated. 
Five conventions (including Dorr) were actually called, and 
four actually met, three of them (People's, Freemen's and 
Final) in 1841 and 1842. The men who framed as well as the 
people who adopted the present Constitution had lived and 
were living in this atmosphere. They or many of them had 
sat in the conventions. This Constitution itself came out of 
such a body. Besides that, Constitutions, mostly produced 
by conventions, had by that time been adopted in every one 
of the other States, and in numbers of them express provision 
was made for their amendment by the convention, as distin-
guished from the legislative, method. I t is simply impossible 
for them not to have known that one common mode of amend-
ing a Constitution was through a convention, and it is equal-
ly impossible for us to believe that if they had intended the 
convention method to have been available in this State, they 
would not have said so. That they were men of insight as 
well as adepts in the use of language appears from the provi-
sions of the great instrument which they drew. Yet, not-
withstanding the foregoing, not only they but also the dele-
gates to the People's Convention and to the Freemen's Con-
vention, held just previously, studiously omitted any word or 
phrase relating to amendment by convention; and Thomas 
W. Dorr, speaking before the People's Convention, stated 
that where a mode of amendment was prescribed by a Consti-
tution it ought to be followed. That all these bodies had the 
principle of amendment in mind, of course, appears from the 
fact that they expressly provided for it, i. e., in Article X I I I , 
and they provided for it in a particularly guarded and ex-
plicit manner. In the Constitution as finally adopted, this 
Article was construed, immediately af ter i ts adoption, in this 
particular, both by Chief Justice Job Durfee and by Profes-
sor William G. Goddard, a professor in civics, who was chos-
en to give an address to the incoming Assembly which con-
vened immediately after the Constitution was adopted. 
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Judge Durfee, in charging the grand jury at Newport at 
the August term of 1843, said: 
"With the exception of a few restrictions, the Legis-
lative power, by an express provision of the Constitu-
tion remains the same as under the charter. Among 
these restrictions, is one of great importance. I t re-
lates to the manner in which the Constitution may be 
amended. When a Constitution prescribes no particu-
lar mode of amendment, i t is by no means to be inferred 
from that fact that it cannot be amended. On the con-
trary, the power of amendment is more ample than with 
a particular provision for that purpose. In such case 
the organized people, acting through their legislature, 
may prescribe any mode that may be deemed most ex-
pedient, taking care not to violate those fundamental 
principles of individual right which lie at the founda-
tions of all constitutional governments. But when a 
particular mode is pointed out in the Constitution it 
must be pursued, for to disregard i t is to act in viola-
tion of a constitutional provision which we are all. and 
particularly the sworn officers of the State, under the 
most solemn obligations to support. A change brought 
about by any other mode than that prescribed by the 
Constitution, when such mode is prescribed by it, would 
be revolutionary. Here we must be governed by the 
provisions of our Constitution. The sworn officers of 
the State must not incur the guilt of perjury by vio-
lating them, and we must all recollect, that when we 
wilfully and knowingly depart from them there is no 
middle ground on which we can stop in our revolu-
tionary progress, short of unmitigated absolute military 
despotism. Once establish it as constitutional lawr in 
this Union, that an article providing for the amend-
ment of a Constitution may be disregarded, or a change 
of government effected without pursuing a legal course, 
and the last trumpet has sounded and the day of doom 
has come to our political institutions." (Cited in Dur-
fee, "Some Thoughts on the Constitution of Rhode 
Island.") 
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Upon the same point, Professor Goddard, in his address, said 
"The people of Rhode Island having determined to 
establish a constitution which, as fa r as practicable, 
should perpetuate the institutions transmitted to them 
by their fathers, have wisely guarded that constitution 
against the dangers of precipitate and disastrous in-
novation. They have placed no insurmountable ob-
structions in the way of such reforms as experience may 
indicate to be necessary. They have, however, ren-
dered it difficult for any faction, however cunning or 
however turbulent, to break down any of the essential 
conservative provisions of the Constitution. The dan-
ger of all precipitate action on the part of the Legis-
lature is excluded, and no organic change can be con-
summated without the consent of a majority of three-
fifths of the people, voting thereon in the primary as-
semblies—thus ensuring the consent of an actual ma-
jority of the whole people. These wise and salutary 
provisions will protect our State against fierce political 
controversies touching the very foundations of the gov-
ernment under which we live. Under free institutions 
the people must be expected to differ about men and 
measures of policy; but the whole social order is in 
danger, the securities of life, liberty and property, are 
in danger whenever it becomes the fashion of the day 
to project changes in the fundamental law, and to 
effect those changes by inflammatory appeals to the 
passions and interests of political parties." 
And that this was the meaning of Article X I I I is fur ther 
asserted and, we believe, established by Mr. Sheffield himself 
in his pamphlet entitled "The Mode of Altering the Consti-
tution of Rhode Island," published in 1887 and now on file 
in The Providence Athenaeum, Reference 2 J T Sh3m, to 
which we respectfully refer the Court. I t will be observed 
that Mr. Sheffield was himself a leading member of the con-
vention which adopted the Constitution and participated in 
draft ing the same. 
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C. History and Usage Since 1843 
What has been the history and usage upon the point in 
Rhode Island since 1843? 
I t is this: In 1853 the General Assembly twice submitted 
to the voters, not amendments to the Constitution or a new 
Constitution, but the question whether a constitutional con-
vention ought to be called. Both proposals were rejected by 
the people, the second time by what Judge Durfee calls "an 
increase over the first vote too significant not to be under-
stood." (Durfee Pamphlet, page 30). 
1. A proposed amendment in 1882 to authorize the 
legislature to call constitutional conventions was rejected. 
Perhaps the most important single incident bearing on the 
matter which has ever occurred here was the result of a con-
stitutional amendment proposed in 1882, the data on which 
we obtain from a memorandum prepared some years ago by 
Walter F. Angell, Esq. 
In 1882, the Legislature of Rhode Island had before it 
various memorials and petitions praying that a convention 
be called to form a new Constitution for the State. All these 
memorials and petitions were referred to a joint select com-
mittee, of which William P. Sheffield of Newport was the 
chairman, being the same gentleman who had been a member 
of the convention which framed the present Constitution of 
the State. And it is fa i r to presume, therefore, that he knew 
what powers as to the calling of a constitutional convention 
the body in which he sat intended to give the General As-
sembly. 
Mr. Sheffield, and with him the remainder of the commit-
tee, was of the opinion that the General Assembly had no 
authority to call such a convention. Mr. Sheffield and his 
committee, nevertheless (considering the number and stand-
ing of the petitioners), concluded that it was their duty to 
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recommend to the General Assembly to propose to the elec-
tors of the State an amendment to the Constitution, which 
amendment, if adopted by the people, would authorize the 
General Assembly to call a constitutional convention, and 
they submitted a resolution proposing such an amendment 
in the following form: 
"Resolved, A majority of all the members elected to 
each house of the general assembly voting therefor, that 
the following amendment to the constitution of the 
State be proposed to the qualified electors of the State, 
in accordance with the provisions of Article X I I I of the 
constitution, for their adoption, to be denominated 
Article V of Amendments, to wi t : 
"ARTICLE V . 
"The general assembly may, a majority of all the 
members elected to each house voting therefor, au-
thorize the qualified electors of the several towns and 
cities to elect as many delegates to a constitutional 
convention as the said towns and cities are respectively 
entitled to elect members of both houses of the general 
assembly, and the delegates when elected shall assemble 
in convention at a time and place to be provided by 
law, and may then revise, alter or amend the constitu-
tion; but no such revision, alteration or amendment 
shall take effect unless when the same is first submitted 
to the qualified electors of the State for their adoption, 
in a manner to be provided by law, three-fifths of all 
the said electors voting thereon shall have voted in 
favor of such revision, alteration or amendment." 
This resolution was passed by two General Assemblies, 
both Republican. Acts and Resolves, January, 1882, page 
275. Acts and Resolves, May, 1882, page 7. 
The amendment was submitted to the electors on Novem-
ber 8, 1882 (the day of the election for representatives in 
Congress), and was defeated by the following vote: 
